I’ve just come across a very interesting and compelling book, entitled Niche Construction: The Neglected Process in Evolution. A web-site on the book can be found here:
http://lalandlab.st-andrews.ac.uk/niche/index.html
Niche construction occurs when organisms modify their own environments through the kinds of activities that they perform (e.g., dam-building, web-spinning, nest-making, etc.). In modifying their own environments, this book argues, organisms can introduce new natural-selective pressures into their environments; and because of these new natural-selective pressures, organisms can end up (indirectly) bringing about modifications in their own genomic make-up. In other words, organisms can modify their own environments, and by doing so they can (indirectly) modify themselves, even at the genomic level. Niche construction thus introduces a kind of feedback-mechanism, or one might even say a certain kind of self-determination, into the process of evolution by natural selection.
Niche construction: organisms on the way to self-determination
December 18th, 2009Tobin vs. Kennedy: grow up, both of you
November 25th, 2009The skirmish between Providence Bishop Thomas J. Tobin and Rep. Patrick J. Kennedy has grabbed national headlines. The Congressman has criticized the Church for opposing health-care reforms that would include taxpayer-funded access to abortion. Furthermore, Kennedy has alleged that Bishop Tobin instructed him not to receive Holy Communion on account of his (Kennedy’s) public stance on abortion. In response, Tobin claimed that he never instructed or demanded that Kennedy refrain from receiving communion, but only “requested” that Kennedy do so. While I have no special affection for either of these men, I wanted to make a brief observation about Catholic teaching and the Catholic tradition that Bishop Tobin claims to be defending. If he believes that traditional Catholic teaching requires Catholic politicians to support the legal prohibition of abortion, then the Bishop would be misunderstanding his own tradition. In fact, St. Thomas Aquinas (indisputably one of the most important and canonical sources for Catholic ‘natural law’ thinking) argues that all law (including the eternal law, natural law, and human law) exists for the sake of the common good. Because law exists for the sake of the common good, and not just particular goods, there will be instances in which “rulers rightly tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be prevented, or even worse evils incurred” (Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 10, a. 11). St. Thomas himself gives the example of prostitution: while acknowledging that prostitution is an evil, St. Thomas (referring approvingly to St. Augustine’s argument in De Ordine II, 4) holds that prostitution should not be prohibited by law, since the legal prohibition of prostitution would prevent certain other goods (e.g., the relative good of providing a tolerable and safe outlet for unpreventable, deviant sexual behavior). Note well: Aquinas’s argument here does not imply in any way that prostitution (or abortion) is morally neutral or morally acceptable. Indeed, prostitution — as well as the destruction of innocent human life through abortion — are instrinsically evil, according to traditional Catholic teaching. But while certain practices (such as prostitution and abortion) are intrinsically evil, it does not follow that it is always right, or even prudent, to combat such evils by means of legal prohibitions. Finally, these observations should not be taken to imply that Rep. Kennedy’s own position is entirely without flaw. While it is consistent with traditional Catholic (and ‘natural law’) thinking to hold that not all evils (including intrinsic evils) should be prohibited by law, it is probably inconsistent with traditional Catholic (and ‘natural law’) thinking to hold (as Rep. Kennedy seems to hold) that intrinsic evils ought to be supported by the use of public funds. In spite of their self-assured, righteous grand-standing, both of these men have alot to learn (and, I think, alot of growing up to do) if they want to be good representatives of their own tradition.
Obama’s ‘Slam Dunk’
November 16th, 2009U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder announced on November 13 that the Obama Administration has decided to try five alleged terrorists (including self-admitted 9/11 mastermind Kahlid Sheikh Mohammed, or KSM) in a federal court in lower Manhattan. Predictably, Republicans and other conservatives have been severely critical of the decision, while many Democrats and other liberals have been supportive. What’s been lost in the debate, however, is the extent to which this decision (which I’ll call the ‘KSM decision’) presents a disturbing mirror-image of the 2003 decision by former President George W. Bush to initiate military action in Iraq (which I’ll call the ‘Iraq decision’). Both the Iraq decision and the KSM decision present (or presented) very high risks, coupled with the possibility of very great rewards.
Though we now know the painful results of the disastrous Iraq decision, one should not overlook the fact that the pre-decision strategizing pointed to the possibility of some real and significant rewards. If it were well-informed at its inception and successful in its execution, the war effort in Iraq could have led to: (a) the elimination of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq (which, of course, turned out not to exist at all!), (b) the liberation of millions of people from a powerful and ruthless tyrant, and (c) the planting of the seeds of democracy in the middle of an otherwise democracy-unfriendly Middle East. In a similar vein, we can acknowledge (in potential support of President Obama and A.G. Holder) that the KSM decision might turn out to be a very good decision in the long run. A federal trial in Manhattan might lead to: (a) the issuance of five well-deserved convictions, (b) a symbolically and diplomatically important demonstration of the transparency and fairness of the American legal system, and (c) a decisive repudiation of the terrorists’ attempts to present themselves to the world as ‘holy warriors’ (an image that they might be able to sustain in military tribunals) rather than as cruel, cold-blooded murderers. But there are also some significant disadvantages to a federal trial in Manhattan: first and most obviously, the financial costs of conducting the trial, and providing added security throughout the city, could be enormous. But beyond the question of financial costs, the prospect of a federal trial in Manhattan presents some very real and serious risks, for example: (a) the legal proceedings might lead to acquittal or dismissal (one Obama-supporter said that convictions in the KSM case would be a ’slam dunk’, but that observation is just as ridiculous as the observation — made by Bush-supporters in 2003 — that the case for going to war in Iraq was a ’slam dunk’); (b) the trial in the heart of Manhattan (already a top target for terrorists) might encourage further ‘copy-cat’ terrorist acts at the time of the trial; (c) the trial might lead to the disclosure of classified military information (in federal court, the defendants will have the right to various kinds of information pertinent to their arrest and detention by the U.S. military); and (d) the trial might in various ways allow the defendants to embarrass the American administration, to spread their venomous and proselytizing messages to other would-be ‘martyrs’, and to mock the already-victimized families who lost loved ones on 9/11.
My sentiments regarding the KSM decision are similar to the sentiments I had at the time of the Iraq decision: “Mr. President, your decision is puzzling to me. I admit that you and your advisers are privy to important information that I do not have. Given my own informational deficit, I dearly hope that you know what you are doing. But since the stakes are so high, you had better be darn sure that you know what you are doing. If your decision turns out to be wrong (if in retrospect, when we have further information, we learn that your decision was a reckless one), then I will not be able to forgive you for it.”
At the end of the day, I am worried that the ultimately decisive motives behind these two decisions (by Bush and Obama) may have had more to do with personal image-promotion than with a careful, well-informed concern for the common good and for long-term consequences. Just as President George W. Bush was inordinately motivated to prove to the world that he is NOT his ‘wimpy’ father (who supposedly failed to ‘finish the job’ in Iraq), so too President Obama may be inordinately motivated to prove that he is NOT George W. Bush, but rather a kinder, gentler, and smarter sort of president, who will be very reluctant to use the military or military tribunals in ‘hard cases’. But acting for the sake of proving that you will not repeat what you perceive to be someone else’s mistakes, does not guarantee that your own decisions will turn out to be the right ones.
Meat-eating and Global Warming
November 2nd, 2009In a recent article in the New York Daily News, Princeton philosopher and animal rights advocate Peter Singer proposed that we begin imposing a heavy new tax on the sale of meat. One justification for such a tax, he argued, was that it would help to reduce meat-consumption and thereby help to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions. As Singer rightly pointed out, a 2006 study by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization showed that livestock are responsible for more greenhouse gas emissions than all forms of transportation combined. More specifically, the study showed that worldwide livestock farming causes about 18% of human-generated greenhouse gas emissions, while only about 13% of human-generated greenhouse gas emissions were caused by all forms of transportion combined (see this BBC news article for more on this). Singer’s article was clearly intended to induce his readers into drawing the inference that reducing our meat consumption (through taxation or other means) would make a significant difference in helping to reduce our greenhouse as emissions. But it would be a mistake to draw such an inference on the basis of Singer’s article. Singer’s article rightly includes some important facts about livestock farming and global warming, but significantly, it also misleads the reader by omitting some other important facts. For example, Singer misleads the reader by failing to mention that (a) a very large number of cows raised in non-western countries are not raised to be eaten, but are raised for other purposes such as doing work in fields; and (b) cows being raised in the western world (i.e., North America and Europe) account for only 15% of all cows worldwide; the other 85% are being raised in non-western countries (and a large number of these ‘non-western’ cows are not being raised for meat). In India, which is home to the largest bovine population in the world, there are 283 million cows that are certainly not being raised as food (by contrast, there are only 34% of that number — roughly 95 million head of cattle — in the United States, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture). So in spite of what Singer intends to imply through his article, it appears that a reduction of meat consumption throughout North America and Europe (where only 15% of all cows live) would not make such a huge difference in reducing our overall greenhouse gas emissions.
The real problem with Obama’s Peace Prize: not its prematurity
October 25th, 2009Many commentators have claimed that the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to President Barack Obama’s was ill-advised, since it was premature. The commentators have claimed that the award should be given for real achievements, and not just for the President’s hopeful rhetoric. The problem, the critics say, is that it is still too early to tell whether Obama’s abstract words and sentiments will ever be translated into real accomplishments. Perhaps the critics are right to say that the Nobel committee ‘jumped the gun’ and acted too early in this respect. But to my mind, there a deeper problem with the the Nobel committee’s decision. The deeper problem is not that the decision reflects an inappropriate precipitousness; the deeper problem, rather, is that the committee’s decision lags too far behind the times, and fails to demonstrate the future-oriented, visionary courageousness that a Peace Prize decision ought to demonstrate. Consider: for many months now, the world community has almost unambiguously endorsed the nobler sentiments expressed by the President’s statements about the need for greater openness, multilateralism, and cooperation in global affairs; through his compelling rhetoric, Barack Obama has already won the world’s attention, affection, and good will. But a Nobel Peace Prize committee ought to do more than merely lend their rubber-stamp-like approval to the ideas and hopes that the world has already accepted from an American President. A Nobel Peace Prize committee ought to take risks by calling attention to some deserving person or persons whose peace-building efforts might really benefit from the added attention and endorsement. Throughout the world today, there are literally hundreds of such deserving individuals who regularly risk their lives for peace, and whose success in such noble efforts is by no means assured. Sadly, instead looking boldly forward and endorsing a cause that could really use their help, the feckless fellows on the Nobel Peace Prize committee chose merely to endorse the rhetoric that we all already believe in. The 2009 Nobel Peace Prize decision represents a blown opportunity to make a real difference to the cause of peace in the world, and to re-assure the world community that the Peace Prize itself remains genuinely relevant.
We share 98% of our genetic make-up with chimpanzees
October 3rd, 2009Biological science tells us that up to 98% of our genetic make-up as human beings is identical to the genetic make-up of chimpanzees. There seems to be no good reason to dispute this scientific claim (notwithstanding attempts by some fundamentalist thinkers to suggest that we do not share 98% of our genetic make-up with chimpanzees). But it is worthwhile to note that approximately 60% of our genetic make-up as human beings is identical to the genetic make-up of the fruit fly; and approximately 40% of our genetic make-up as human beings is identical to the genetic make-up of lettuce. It does not follow, of course, that fruit flies are 60% human, or that lettuce is 40% human; nor does it follow that chimpanzees are 98% human. Another way of making the point is to say that 100% of our genetic make-up as human beings is identical to the genetic make-up of our gluteus maximus muscle (that’s because almost every cell in the human body — including a typical muscle cell — contains a full copy of the human genome); but of course, it does not follow that a human ass is the same as a human being (though the reverse is very often true, metaphorically-speaking). What is crucial in determining what a thing is, and why it is what it is, is not just the genetic make-up (what Aristotle would have called the material cause), but rather the formation, the organization, the structuring, and the expression of that genetic make-up (what Aristotle would have called the formal cause). Two different things can be made out of almost the same — or even exactly the same — constituents or components, and yet nevertheless remain two very different kinds of things. Consider the fact that 100% of our sub-atomic make-up as human beings is identical to the sub-atomic make-up of a bowling ball; the human being and the bowling ball are made up of the very same sub-atomic constituents: protons, neutrons, and electrons. It does not follow, however, that a human being and a bowling ball are the same kind of thing; indeed we have good reason — in most cases — to hold that human beings and bowling balls are different kinds of things, and have rather different natures and capacities.
Every animal species is ’speciesist’
August 19th, 2009‘Animal rights’ guru Peter Singer tells us that speciesism “is a prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of other species.” If we accept his definition, it seems we are compelled to admit that every animal species is speciesist. Indeed, it seems that animal species have survived over the years (thanks to natural selection) only because they are good at being ’speciesist’. Throughout the animal kingdom, parents of various species work at feeding, sheltering, nurturing, defending, and — in general — caring for their young, regularly to the detriment of other species. When a mommy bird feeds a worm to her own hatchlings, do we have to say (relying on Singer’s own definition) that the bird is a ’speciesist’? If someone refuses to call the bird a ’speciesist’, then an explanation is surely owed to the poor worm (or perhaps to the orphaned baby worms).
But the real problem with Singer’s position is to be found in his muddle-headed moralizing. Singer says that ’speciesism’ is morally condemnable. Fine — but if we are going to judge all species by the same standards (if we are going to avoid ’speciesism’ in all of its manifestations), then speciesism in other species ought to be condemned just as vehemently as one condemns speciesism in human beings. On the other hand, if speciesism is condemnable in human beings but not similarly condemnable in other species, then on what grounds do we draw the distinction between the human species and other species (even though their ’speciesist’ behavior is the same)? Is it because human beings are capable of acting as accountable (responsible) agents, while members of other species are not? If so, then there seems to be an essential difference between human beings and members of other species — in which case humans are justified in regarding themselves as having capacities that other species do not have; in which case they would be justified in being ’speciesist’! In short: if speciesism is intrinsically condemnable, then it should be condemnable in other species as well as in humans; but if speciesism is condemnable in humans but not in other species, then humans must have some capacities that other species do not have (in which case humans have good reason to be ’speciesist’, and so speciesism in not really condemnable in humans!).
Different senses of ‘Natural Law’
August 17th, 2009The term “natural law” is used in many different contexts and for many different purposes.
According to one sense of the term, “natural law” thinking is a kind of thinking that belongs to jurisprudence or theory of law. According to this sense of the term, a person who endorses “natural law thinking” is one who holds that the directives of a legal sovereign must meet at least some (perhaps minimal) moral requirements in order to be valid even as law. To be a “natural law thinker” in this sense is to reject the legal positivist’s claim that there is no “necessary connection” between law and morality.
According to a second sense of the term, “natural law” thinking is a kind of thinking that belongs to moral or ethical theory. This second sense of the term can be further divided into a broader sense and a more restricted sense. According to the broader sense, a person who endorses “natural law thinking” as a matter of moral theory is one who holds that judgments regarding what is morally permissible, morally impermissible, and morally obligatory, can be rationally assessed as genuinely right or wrong judgments (even if, in some circumstances, it may be difficult to make judgments that are clearly known to be the right ones). In accordance with this broader sense of the term, natural law thinking in moral theory stands opposed to all forms of moral relativism or subjectivism (including emotivism and conventionalism), and is compatible with a wide range of diverging ethical theories (including various forms of deontology, contractarianism, and utilitarianism). According to the more restricted sense of the term, a person who endorses “natural law thinking” as a matter of moral theory is one who holds that correct judgments regarding what is morally permissible, morally impermissible, and morally obligatory are shown to be correct precisely insofar as they can be justified by reference to the ends or goals that are perfective of beings (including human beings), given the kinds of nature that such beings possess. Natural law moral thinking in this more restricted sense is opposed to kinds of “natural law” moral thinking (i.e., it is opposed to certain kinds of natural law moral thinking in the broader sense) insofar as these other kinds of moral thinking seek to explain or justify moral judgments not by reference to “nature,” but by reference to autonomy, consent, preference-satisfaction, or some other ground. Natural law moral thinking in this more restricted sense can be further divided into two sub-species: (a) “naturalistic” natural law moral thinking (in the restricted sense), according to which judgments regarding what ought to be the case (i.e., judgments about “goods” or “values”) are derivable from judgments about what is the case (i.e., judgments about “facts” or “states of affairs”); and (b) “non-naturalistic” natural law moral thinking (in the restricted sense), according to which judgments regarding what ought to be the case are not derivable from judgments about what is the case.
Finally, according to a third sense of the term, “natural law” thinking is a kind of thinking that involves claims about what is distinctive about human beings and thus about what uniquely characterizes the nature or dignity that is properly attributed to human beings (in contrast with the nature or dignity that might be attributed to other kinds of beings, such as non-rational animals). Not surprisingly, natural law thinking in this third sense of the term is closely connected with theorizing about “natural rights” and/or “human rights.” This third sense of the term is famously expressed by the Thomistic proposition that there is no “natural law” in non-rational animals, although there is “natural law” in human beings, since the natural law pertains to the way that human beings participate in God’s eternal law in a “more excellent” way (that is, in a rational way) that is not open to non-rational creatures. According to this third sense of “natural law thinking,” human beings — precisely insofar as they are rational beings — possess a nature that is different in kind, and not merely different in degree, from that possessed by other animals, and thus possess basic dignity or rights that other, non-rational creatures do not possess.
It should be noted, of course, that a person can endorse “natural law thinking” in one sense of the three term, without necessarily endorsing “natural law thinking” in the others senses. For example, a person can be a natural law thinker in the second (broader) sense of the term, without necessarily being a natural law thinker in the third sense of the term. Thus Peter Singer, the well-known utilitarian philosopher and defender of “animal rights,” has argued that it is possible to make moral judgments that are genuinely right or wrong (in accordance with the second, broader sense of natural law thinking), but also holds (in opposition to the third sense of natural law thinking) that “all animals are equal” when it comes to what is owed to animals (whether rational or not) as a matter of basic justice or rights.
Don’t Be Fooled by the ‘Painting Elephants’
August 1st, 2009Some time ago, a friend of mine in the animal welfare movement called my attention to an online video which showed elephants holding paint brushes with their trunks and apparently making paintings. My animal welfare friend shared this video with me, in order to make the point that animals are capable of producing paintings and thus are not different in kind, but only in degree, from human beings. I was immediately sceptical, and I pointed out that it was probably more likely that the elephants were not really making their own paintings (they were not aware of themselves as producing some picture, X, to represent some reality, Y), but rather were being conditioned and trained by humans who were producing the paintings by manipulating the actions of the elephants. A Feb. 2009 web-posting by world-famous ethologist Desmond Morris confirms my point. As Morris explains, the sad fact is that (a) no elephant is capable of producing anything but the same image over and over again; and (b) the elephant’s apparent act of painting is controlled by the actions of a trainer (known as a ‘mahout’) who tugs on the elephant’s ear in order to guide the elephant’s brush-strokes in one direction or another. As Morris puts it, “there is no elephantine invention, no creativity, just slavish copying.” In effect, my animal welfare friend allowed himself to be hoodwinked by his own wishful thinking about animals, and by the fiction created by these elephant trainers (or mahouts). What’s worse is that (a) this fiction is a very lucrative one (these so-called ‘elephant paintings’ are sold to tourists and to online buyers for up to several hundred dollars a piece), and (b) many of these elephants are treated quite badly (whipped and beaten) as they are conditioned and trained to make these paintings. The irony here is that my scepticism about ‘elephant painting’ does more to help call attention to animal suffering and (hopefully) put an end to this often-cruel market for ‘elephant paintings’ than does the naive, wishful thinking of my animal welfare friend.
Beer Summit
July 31st, 2009I am glad that Obama, Biden, Gates, and Crowley were able to sit down amicably and have their discussion about the future of race-sensitivities and race-relations in this country. But I am also concerned about the dissonant message that they may be sending, unwittingly, as a result of this ‘beer summit’. With BOTH the President and Vice-President sitting down for a leisurely drink of beer, who is attending to all those urgent needs that both the President and Vice-President keep talking about? Or maybe this beer summit really was orchestrated precisely in order to begin addressing those urgent needs. After all, if the President does not first do something to fix the public relations nightmare he created for himself (by saying that the Cambridge Police acted “stupidly”), then he may not have the public trust and credibility that he’ll eventually need in order to pass all that legislation about the country’s urgent needs…..